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There are many philosophies. It is as weil then at the outset to state what is meant 
by philosophy in this paper*. 
Philosophy here is a critical realism1• Such a philosophy starts from the relevant 
data which must be carefully ascertained and utterly respected. The data of 
consciousness, which include but arewider than the date ofthe senses, are the most 
accessible to the philosopher. However the philosopher is not an isolated monad 
but a social being. So, data for philosophizing is drawn also from the kind ofshared 
knowing we call 'common sense' and from all the other kinds ofknowing which we 
call naturalandhuman science, mathematics, history, art and literature, theology, 
religious experience and so on. 
A word of warning must be uttered immediately. No one philosopher can cope 
nowadays with all the data ofthe real world; not to speak oftrying to explain them. 
The proliferation of data, the growth of knowledge, has forced us into specializa-
tion. So, we have philosophers ofknowledge, of science, ofman, ofGod, of ethics, of 
hermeneutics and so on. Nowadays, although philosophers endeavour to have a 
professional generalist's grasp of philosophical conclusions outside their own 
proper field - and although there is overlapping between fields - an all-embracing 
detailed philosophy does not exist in any one head. 
Philosophers then give their concentrated attention to the relevant data; neither 
adding anything nor taking anything away. When they strive to perceive the data 
and search for a form of words to express what has been perceived they use the 
method (not necessarily the ontology) ofthe phenomenologist. That is to say, they 
willlabour to arrive at a formulation or description which is so clear and complete 
that any person of good will (who has perceived the data, reflected upon them and 
who understands the words) will accept and acquiesce. 
Attention to the data is only the beginning. Philosophers contemplate and reflect 
on the data. They seek an understanding. That is to say they seek an explanatory, 
intelligible pattern of relations, connections or disconnections, between parts or 
articulations or aspects of the data. Likewise they will seek relationships between 
various sets of data. 
However an understanding is not enough. Philosophers seek the understanding, the 
fully reasonable understanding. They must satisfy themselves that all the relevant 
questions have been asked and answered. They try to discover not merely what can 
be intelligently grasped but also what can be reasonably affirmed2• Only when they 
have checked and rechecked all the available evidence (not merely in their own but 
against other minds) can they decide and affirm 'it is so!' As far as humanly possible 
they have grasped and known reality. 
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This method ofphilosophizing has been called the 'generalized empirical method'3. 
The structured form of knowing just outlined is clearly applicable when trying to 
analyse and understand the data of consciousness. The same method, which is in-
variable, is used in striving to understand the data of common sense and the data of 
all the other modes ofhuman knowing. The term 'data of consciousness' is applied 
to our experience of psychic activity as such; as opposed to 'data of the senses'. 
However the term is applicable, of course, to all human knowing in all its modes. 
Commonsense, the sciences, the arts, theology, all modes ofhuman knowing have 
their own particular method. These methods are autonomous and philosophers 
must respect the autonomy. Each mode of knowing, by means of its own specific 
use of intelligence, arrives at its own particular aspects of reality, its own realm of 
being, its own particular world. The philospher's task is not to teach the scientist 
science nor to meddle in the rapid, pragmatic insights of common sense. Philoso-
phers have differnt work to do4. 
By means of each different mode of cognition we know different partial aspects of 
the world. Common sense as such knows nothing of the sciences. The sciences go 
beyond and beneath common sense and sometimes seem even to contradict it. The 
poet may know nothing of the distinct worlds of the historian and the mathe-
matician. Apparent contradictions between different aspects of the world can be 
resolved once the different types of knowing are recognized. 
The primary task of philosophers is to attempt an integration of the many and dif-
ferent forms ofhuman knowing. They attempt this in the knowledge that all modes 
of human knowing are complementary, nottobe confused with one another, and 
all necessary (although not all in one head) to build up an over-all view of the 
universe. This primary task of integration is positives. 
Philosophers may have negative tasks to perform also. Every mode ofhuman know-
ing can deviate from its proper and particular method. A historian can abandon a 
proper objectivity and espouse the more consoling popular prejudices of common 
sense. A theologian (failing to consult historians or exegetes) may build a whole 
theory on misinterpreted texts. People, believing themselves safely within their 
own proper fields, ask questions, attempt solutions, make extrapolations and asser-
tians that are in fact outside their proper brief or charter, beyond the capacity of 
their particular methods or instruments to achieve. Modes of knowing can be 
unwittingly employed in realms of reality where they have no competence. The 
positivist who tries to explain religious experience is an example. Art is deformed 
when it is instrumentalized crudely to be didactic. 
The philosopher must not try to impose a philosophical method on the scientist 
who is doing science, on the artist who is doing art and so on. Philosophers however 
must try to perceive various deviations from proper method in the different realms 
of human knowing. Philosophers must then endeavour to persuade scientists, 
artists, theologians, historians, men and women of common sense, and so on, to 
reorientate their proper specialized mode ofknowing and of discovery so that reali-
ty may be properly known in all its aspects. 
That is what I mean by philosophy. 
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Philosophy of communication 
A philosophy of communication then must attend to the relevant data on which it 
will reflect in a search for critical understanding. 
The data of consciousness must be included in the reflection. In our waking hours, 
when we are in the company of people and perceived by them, we are trying to com-
municate, communicating or failing to communicate all the time. Very many, 
although not all, of our dreams are about communication6. 
A phenomenologist method of careful Observation, critical analysis and exact 
formulation is needed to render an account of the data of consciousness or of any 
other data. There is no doubt that such a method can be greatly helped by familiar-
ity with the most important literature, drama, cinema and art. 
The method employed must take into account very seriously the findings ofhuman 
scientists: psychologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and, in 
particular, those human scientists who have specialized in the study of inter-
personal and mass communication. 
Scientific research into communication is (and perhaps always will be) incomplete. 
Furtherresearch will be carried out with better instruments and further questions 
will arise for the philosopher to ponder over. Even at present however it seems clear 
that we are sure enough ofthe main features ofthe communication process to make 
possible the construction of an enlightening and verifiable model ofthat process. 
For example, it happens that the last empirical details of some situation or event 
have not been scientifically determined: 'do people read all the books they borrow 
from a library?' Or, the exact significance of a set of statistics has not been verified 
or is unverifiable at the moment. 
That however does not mean that all is lost. The human scientist is dissatisfied. But 
enough can be known - short of scientific certainty - ab out the situation, event or 
statistics for a philosopher to decide that a contingent tendency, drive, deviation or 
aberration must be taken into account as a possibility if a complete framework or 
frame of reference is tobe formed within which the process of communication can 
be understood. 
Interdisciplinarity 
Clearly then philosophers' investigation of communication has tobe interdiscipli-
nary. It is not easytobe interdisciplinary in a satisfactory way. It is necessary tobe 
sufficiently familiar with literatures, arts, areas of philosphical investigation other 
than one's own, theologies, religion and so on. In particular philosophers must read 
sufficiently in different branches of the human sciences. 
Different disciplines have their particularviewpoints, methods, languages. Philoso-
phers must learn the technicallanguages. They must also perceive and respect the 
specific viewpoints and methods- in sofaras they arejustified- as neccesary and 
autonomous. 
Philosophers must then try to understand, from a philosophical point ofview, the 
insights grasped by non-philosophical modes ofinvestigating and knowing. Philoso-
phers must try to be unifiers, integrators and when necessary re-orientating critics. 
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What philosophers of communication try to do is likely not to be weil received by 
human scientists. Even though philosophers respect the autonomy of human 
science, they are stilllikely to be seen by scientists as interlopers. The dismayed 
human scientists, rightly situated in their own proper viewpoint, and Operating 
according to their own proper method, are likely to find the philosophical viewpoint 
unintelligible and the philosophical method at least distasteful. In practice, philo-
sophers can only grin and bear it7. 
Aim of a philosophy of communication 
The direct aim of philosophy of communication is not the making of a better com-
municator in practice. To become a good communicator various attitudes and skills 
are required. Acquiring or teaching those skills isadifferent discipline from a philo-
sophy of communication. Unterstarrding and acquiring the skills of communication 
belongs to a discipline called 'communication arts'. There is no attempt at a full 
treatment of communication arts in this paper; such a treatment lies outside my 
scope. 
However, in practice, a philosophy of communication is indirectly useful. It can 
provide a useful mental background from which communication can be planned. It 
can save a would-be communicator from exaggerated expectations and subsequent 
disillusionments. 
The direct aim of a philosophy of communication is to understand the whole 
process of communication. It is an effort to understand how and why communi-
cation succeeds or how and why it fails. The success or failure may be total or 
partial. 
A philosophy of communication should help one to recognize some theories (i.e. 
early deterministic behaviourism) as thoroughly unsatisfactory and others (i.e. the 
basically publicist minor determinism ofMarshall McLuhan) as confused and mis-
leading9. 
Philosophers 
Nota few philosophers touch upon the problern of communication. However what 
they have to say on this subject is usually too implicit, too unsystematic, too partial 
or too conceptualist. 
Older philosophers were of course hampered by their Iack ofthe dimension given 
by the modest success of our contemporary psychology and sociology. Even St 
Thomas Aquinas in bis article De Magistro is unsatisfactory today10• His concepts 
are impeccable and his logic exact but he Iacks perforce the grip on the singular and 
the empirical which we demand of a contemporary philosophy. 
Modem philosophers like the early Ayer11, Wittgenstein 12, the structuralists13, 
Chomsky14, the philosophers oflanguagels, are too partial in their approach. They 
deal almost exclusively with the communicative sign. What they have to say is often 
of great interest but it is not nearly a total philosophy of communication. These 
philosophers can be powerful to arouse initial interest in the problern of communi-
cation and, as weil, they can provide a method for achieving the final step in inter-
pretation. I find they tend, however, rather to neglect the middle ground: the 
questions one must ask about the whole process from perception to interpretation. 
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Two philosophers have dealt directly '1d fairly systematically with communica-
tion. They are Alfred Schutz (the Austrian phenomenologist and friend ofHusserl) 
and Bernard Lonergan, the Canadian Jesuit, philosopher and theologian'6 anct 17. 
Schutz and Lonergan agree with and complement one another. Suzanne Langer, 
the phenomenologist disciple of Ernst Cassirer, has gone further than Schutz and 
Lonergan in working out what symbols are and how one kind of symbol communi-
cates's. These are the philosophers I attempt to follow in constructing my model. 
One version of the sociology of knowledge, represented by Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, draws heavily on Schutz's insights'9 . This kind of macro-
sociology is not easily distinguished from a philosophy. 
Elements of the problem 
Communication is sharing meaning. 
This statement seems tobe as incontrovertible as it is obvious. I arrived at the state-
ment first about ten years ago after meditating on a sentence from Bernard Loner-
gan's Metbad in Theology: 'A community ... is an achievement of common 
meaning'20. The statement needs to be explained and explaining the proposition 
'Communication is sharing meaning' is the whole task of a philosophy of communi-
cation. 
A slightly different proposition is also true: 'Communication is sharing non-
meaning'. Here 'non-meaning' signifies non-sense or error. Error and nonsense are 
certainly communicated and indeed very successfully. 
To explain or understand these propositions it is necessary to ask the following 
questions and look for answers. 
a) What is 'meaning'? From Plato on philosophers have asked this question at least 
implicitly. I do not see the discovery of meaning - which must precede any attempt 
to share meaning - as merely taking a look at something outside. The discovery 
of meaning is a structured process. It is a process which involves necessarily being 
attentive, reflective, intelligent, reasonable and, finally, being responsible in 
judgment. This is the structured process of knowing and what is finally judged to 
be known is precisely meaning. Meaning is then interior to the knower. Because of 
this inferiority, some material or corporeal means must be found to manifest 
meaning (the fruit ofhidden psychic activity) to others with whom it is desirable to 
share it. 
b) What is 'sharing'? In this context, investigation leads us to consider carriers of 
meaning: the means by which a meaning is offered to another. 
Here I follow Alfred Schutz's analysis of marks, indications, signs and symbols. 
This treatment helps one to see that perception or apperception of a material object 
or event (which is the carrier of meaning) is both necessary and irrelevant. I say 
necessary because only something perceptible can bridge the gap between two 
psyches. I say irrelevant because carriers ofmeaning arenot designed to give under-
standing of the material object or event which they themselves are. They are 
designed to lead to understanding something eise. That is what is meant when we 
say the specific function of carriers of meaning is appresentational rather than per-
ceptual. The function transcends the material object or event which is perceived. 
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By means of carriers of meaning one is enabled to transcend the limitations of the 
Self, to reach out and explore the multiple finite provinces of meaning by which 
reality is mediated. 
c) Who are they who try to communicate and how do they operate in the process? 
What are the possibilities and limitations in concrete persans that affect their 
carrying out of the process of sharing meaning? This leads to an examination of 
commonplace findings in empirical and social psychology about cognition and 
motivation and an analysis ofhuman science research in mass-media communica-
tion. These two considerations are the basis for philosophizing about, what weshall 
call (in Lonergan's words) 'individual', 'dramatic' and 'group biases'; their social 
effects and the possibility of their reversal. 
d) From a consideration ofthe foregoing analysis, is it possible to form an over-all 
plan to encourage and improve the quality of communication? My affirmative 
answer- both modestand cautious -leads to 'An overallplan for communication'. 
Herewe have to consider (again using Lonergan's terms) the 'general bias of com-
mon sense' and, its social consequence, the 'longer cycle of decline' which is diffi-
cult to reverse. The kind of knowing we call 'common sense' has a tendency to be 
unquestioning, inert, stagnant. This stagnant inertia tends to obtrude itself into 
other modes ofhuman knowing. Human knowing then can and does deteriorate; as 
knowing deteriorates so too does communication. An overallplan for communica-
tion then must be built, first of all, on a re-education which fosters a critical aware-
ness of and a practical understanding of the modes of human knowing. 
The everyday world 
That is why it is important, before attempting to answer the four questions explicit-
ly, to consider, in the first place and at some length, a philosophy ofthe everyday 
world. That involves a consideration of everyday knowing which is common sense 
and a philosophy of everyday communication. 
A sufficiently hard philosophical analysis of everyday life is necessary because a 
great deal of our daily knowing and communication happens within the world of 
common sense. In addition, whether the meaning to be shared is on the level of 
everyday common sense or on some ofthe higher levels ofscience, art, philosophy, 
theology or religion, the carriers of meaning, the communicative signs are always 
and ofnecessity in the world ofimmediacy; that is, the world ofsensation, the world 
which is the source of data for common sense21 . I have read some accounts ofthe 
communication process which were ultimately unsatisfactory because the writers 
were far too unaware that the everyday world is only one ofthe aspects ofthe real 
world in which we live and communicate. These writers bad not sufficiently dif-
ferentiated their consciousness. 
To analyse the world of daily life philosophically is to begin to differentiate one's 
consciousness. That is to say, it is to begin tobe aware of and to recognize different 
forms or modes ofhuman knowing and, consequently, ofhuman communication. 
These forms or modes ofhuman knowing and communicating grasp and endeavour 
to share different modes of meaning, different aspects or realms of reality, different 
worlds; all of which are desirable and necessary aspects of the real world, none of 
which must be confused with any of the others22. 
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Differentiated consciousnesses arenot common. Yet today, when we are inundated 
with views, opinions, convictions of all shapes, sizes and colours ( conveyed to us by 
highly sophisticated means), the differentiation of consciousness is· urgently neces-
sary. Undifferentiated consciousness is likely to result in an inert, unquestioning, 
stagnant common sense which can infect all other modes ofhuman knowing. Inade-
quate and uncritical knowing Ieads necessarily to inadequate communication. That 
is why, in any overallplan for safeguarding communication, I see re-education in a 
proper method of knowing as fundamental. 
Footnotes 
I have been teaching a coursein the philosophy of communication for the last eight years. 
The course occupies a little more than one third ofthe academic year and is part of'philo-
sophy of knowledge' and epistemology. 
About 1979, Frs. Robert A. White, S.J. (Director ofResearch) and Stefan Bamberger, S.J. 
(General Director) ofthe Centre for the Study ofCommunication and Culture in London 
(CSCC, 221 Goldhurst Terrace, Hampstead, London NW6 3EP) asked me to write at 
length on the philosophy of communication. With considerable misgiving, I agreed. The 
book wastobe one in a series of monographs planned and in preparation by the Centre. 
However when I had finished writing it became apparent that my work was more suitable 
for a series called 'Reports and Studies': long 'working-papers' published by the Centre. 
My long paper is, I hope, only a beginning. Its natureisthat ofa university 'text-book' and 
it is better read in a situation where discussion and dialogue are possible. I wrote it with my 
stable 'audience', my students, in mind. Pedagogically, over the years, my method has 
been satisfactory. 
1 This is the type of philosophy practised by Bernard Lonergan. Insight: a study ofhuman 
understanding. London: 1967. (7th student's edition). Method in Theology. London: 
1972. 
2 Bernard Lonergan. lnsight. Chapter 14, sec. 2, p. 391. 
3 lbid. Chapter 7, sec. 9, p. 243. 
4 lbid. Chapter 14, sec. 4.5, pp. 423-430. 
5 lbid. Chapter 14, sec. 2 and 3, pp. 398-399. 
6 lbid. Chapter 6, sec. 2.5 and 2.3, pp. 187 and 184. 
7 Ibid. Chapter 14, sec. 4.6, pp. 423-430. 
8 Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey. Individual in Society. London, N.Y.: 1962. Interna-
tional Student Edition. P. 23. 
9 Herbert Marshall McLuhan. The Meaning is the Massage. Penguin. This short book is the 
best outline of McLuhan's ideas. 
10 De Veritate. Q.XI. De Magistro, art 1. 'Utrum homo docere alium possit et dici magister, 
vel Deus solus?' 
11 A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. London: 1967. Cf. Men ofldeas. British Broadca-
sting Corporation: 1978. This is the expanded text of Brian Magee's interviews with 15 
philosophers. Ayer, pp. 118-133. 
12 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical lnvestigations. Oxford: 1963. Cf. Men of Ideas, pp. 
98-115. 
13 Philip Petit. The concept of structuralism. Dublin: 1975. 
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14 Noam Chomsky. Aspects ofthe theory ofsyntax. Massachusetts: 1967. Df. Men ofldeas. 
pp. 204-223. 
15 John R. Searle. Speech Acts: an essay in the philosophy of language. London: 1970. Cf. 
Men of Ideas, pp. 182 fT. 
16 Alfred Schutz. Collected Papers. 3 volumes. The Hague: 1973. 
17 Bernard Lonergan. Cf. note 1. 
18 Suzanne Langer. Feeling and Form. London: 1953. Philosophy in a new key. Harvard and 
London: 1957. 
19 Peter Berg er and Thomas Luckmann. The social construction of reality: a treatise in the 
sociology ofknowledge. London: 1971. Bergerand Luckmann freely admit their debt to 
Alfred Schutz: cf. note 16. 
20 Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology. Darton, Langman and Todd: London: 1972. Part 
1, chapter 3, sec. 8, p. 79. 
21 Alfred Schutz. op. cit. Valurne 1, pp. 321 fT. 
22 Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology. Pp. 303 fT. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Es gibt viele Philosophien. Deswegen ist es gut zu sagen, was hier unter Philosophie verstan-
den wird. Sie wird hier verstanden als kritischer Realismus. Eine solche Philosophie beginnt 
mit den gegebenen Daten, die respektiert werden müssen. Die Daten des Bewußtseins- wel-
che weiter sind als jene der Sinne, sie aber mit beinhalten - sind für den Philosophen am 
besten zugänglich. Aber er ist keine Monade. Er muß deswegen alle anderen Lebensbereiche 
des Menschen mit berücksichtigen. Dabei ist klar, daß kein Philosoph alle Gegebenheiten 
unserer heutigen Welt voll berücksichtigen kann ... Aber die Beachtung der gegebenen 
Daten ist nur der Anfang. Die Philosophen betrachten diese Gegebenheiten und denken 
über sie nach, suchen diese einzeln und in ihren Zusammenhängen besser zu verstehen. 
Dabei ist nicht irgend ein Verstehen genug, es geht um das Verstehen. Erst nach sorgfältiger 
Arbeit stellen sie dann fest: es ist so. Diese Methode wird als die generalisierende empirische 
Methode bezeichnet. Sie gilt besonders, wenn es um Dinge des menschlichen Bewußtseins 
geht. Hauptaufgabe des Philosophen ist die Integration der verschiedenen Formen menschli-
chen Wissens und menschlicher Erfahrung, wobei die einzelnen Wissenschaften als 
solche durchaus in ihrer Eigenständigkeit respektiert werden müssen. 
Eine Philosophie der Kommunikation muß alle Daten der verschiedenen Wissenschaften 
berücksichtigen, aber dann kann sie schon dort Aussagen machen, wo die exakte Wissen-
schaft noch nicht zufrieden ist. So mögen z.B. Informationen über den Buchverleih einer 
Bibliothek solche Wissenschaftler noch nicht voll befriedigen. Aber der Philosoph kann aus 
einem Teil dieser Daten schon eine Tendenz, einen Irrweg oder auch den Kern einer Ent-
wicklung ablesen. Selbstverständlich muß eine solche Philosophie interdisziplinär grundge-
legt sein. Eine Philsosophie der Kommunikation ist kein Ersatz für eine Fachausbildung. Für 
die Praxis ist eine Philosophie der Kommunikation nur indirekt nützlich, indem sie den Hin-
tergrund aufhellt, auf dem Kommunikation geplant werden kann: So können falsche Erwar-
tungen verhindert und Enttäuschungen abgebaut werden. 
Direktes Ziel einer Kommunikationsphilosophie ist das bessere umfassendere Verständnis 
des Kommunikationsprozesses als solchen. 
Verschiedene Philosophen haben das Gebiet Kommunikation erwähnt, aber was sie sagen, 
ist meistens zu implizit, zu unsystematisch und bruchstückhaft. Den alten Philosophen 
fehlt oft- einschließlich Thomas von Aquin in seinem "Oe Magistro" -die konkrete heutige 
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fehlt oft - einschließlich Thomas von Aquin in seinem "De Magistro" - die konkrete heutige 
Erfahrung als Ausgangspunkt. Zwei moderne Philosophen haben sich unmittelbar mit dem 
Thema befaßt, Alfred Schutz und Bernard Lonergan. Susanne Langer, Phä'nomenologin und 
Schülerin von Cassirer, ging noch weiter als Schutz und Lonergan. 
Wenn man versucht, die Elemente des Problems aufzulisten, dann muß man zunächst fest-
stellen, daß Kommunikation der Austausch von Meinungen ist. Dies zu erklären ist Aufgabe 
einer Kommunikationsphiolosophie. 
Meinung ist ein strukturierter Vorgang, der der Erklärung bedarf. Was weiter heißt dann Mit-
teilen (Sharing) und dann die Frage nach jenen, die Kommunikation betreiben: Wer sind sie 
und was können sie innerhalb welcher Grenzen? Es ist die Frage zu stellen nach der indivi-
duellen, der dramatischen und der Gruppeneinstellung (Lonergan). Kann man dann von die-
sen Voraussetzungen aus zu übergreifendem Verständnis kommen, was die Qualität von 
Kommunikation verbessert? Nur eine gesunde allgemeine Philosophie des menschlichen 
Lebens kann Grundlage auch einer guten und realistischen Kommunikationsphilosophie 
sein. Eine philosophische Analyse unserer täglichen Welt hilft, in unserem Bewußtsein zu 
unterscheiden. Das ist der Anfang menschlichen Wissens und damit auch menschlicher 
Kommunikation ... 
RESUME 
Une philosophie de Ia communication doit tenir campte des donnees des di!Terentes scien-
ces. Alors, elle peut deja apporter des temoignages Ja ou Ja science exacte !es refuse encore. A 
partir de donnees, Je phi!osophe peut deja degager une tendence, une fausse voie ou egale-
rneut Je noyau d'un developpement. Le but direct d'une philosophie de Ia communication est 
Ja meilleure et Ja plus complete comprehension du processus de communication. Deux 
philosophes modernes ont examines de pres ce sujet: Alfred Schutz et Bernard Lonergan. A 
eux vient s'ajouter encore Susanne Langer. La philosophie de Ia communication vient princi-
palement declarer Ia communication un echange d'opinions. On recherche ce qu'il faut com-
muniquer et a qui il faut Je communiquer. Seule une philosophie generale saine peut etre 
egalement Ia base d'une banne philosophie realiste de Ia communication. 
RESUMEN 
Una filosofia de Ia comunicaci6n social deberia tener en cuenta los datos de las diversas cien-
cias. De ests modo podria pronunciarse sobre aspectos a los que todavia no llegan las ciencias 
exactas. A base de los datos de otras ciencias, Ia filosofia puede descubrir una tendencia, un 
camino erroneo o el nucleo de una evoluci6n. EI objeto propio de una filosofia de Ia comuni-
caci6n es una comprensi6n mejor y mäs amplia del proceso de Ia comunicaci6n social. Das fi-
16sofos modernos se ocuparon directamente del tema, Alfred Schutz y Bernard Lonergan, a 
los que hay que afiadir Susanne Langer. La filosofia de Ja comunicaci6n busca sobre todo ex-
plicar Ia comunicaci6n social como intercambio de opiniones. Se pregunta sobre lo partici-
pado y los participantes. Solo una sana filosofia general de Ja vida humana puede ser base para 
una filosofia, buena y realista, de Ia comunicaci6n social. 
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